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1. Introduction
People pay taxes and receive benefits according to their position in thelife-
cycle. If we divide society into three age groups (young, middle-aged, el-
derly), then only the middle-aged pay more to the public budgets than they
receive. On the contrary, the young and elderly contribute to public budgets
to a very limited extent. Thus, a representative agent of a certain age is ei-
ther a net contributor or a net beneficiary. Based on these arguments, it fol-
lows that the size and structure of population decisively affects the balance
of public budgets.
Indeed, the government does not have to pay all of its expenditure im-
mediately using only tax revenues and privatization receipts. In the case
that the government’s expenditures exceed its revenues, the government
takes out a loan or issues bonds. Still, these obligations will have to be re-
paid one day. From the generational point of view, this means that the use
of the alternative ways of financing results in shifts of the financial burden
from current to future generations, i.e. intergenerational redistribution 
takes place. Thus, the actual fiscal policy affects the net wealth of not only
presently living generations but also of generations not yet born.
Unfortunately, neither commonly used public budget deficits nor public
debt records any intergenerational shifts or the way in which current fis-
cal policy influences net wealth of arepresentative current and future agent.
One of the tools which can be used to assess an intergenerational balance
or imbalance is generational accounting. This approach reflects long-term
implications of current fiscal policy arrangements for intergenerational re-
distribution and fiscal sustainability when taking into account expected de-
mographic development. This methodology was developed by Auerbach,
Gokhale and Kotlikoff in 1991. The main issue was to quantify the impact
of a government policy on the net wealth of current as well as future gene-
rations.
We would like to stress that generational accounting is not a generational
equilibrium model-based approach, but only an indicator based on a trend
projection. On the contrary, this projection is elaborate, introduces some
economic theory and expected demographic development. Thegoal is to com-
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Bank. The usual disclaimer applies.pare the present value of the growth-adjusted lifetime burden, faced by
a representative current and future agent, under the condition that the in-
tertemporal budget constraint holds. Alternatively, it is possible to calcu-
late the total amount of the government’s liabilities stemming from the cur-
rent fiscal-policy proceeds indefinitely. Moreover, alternative scenarios
could help to identify potential ways of improving intergenerational imba-
lance.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the sustainability of the present fis-
cal policy in the case of the Czech Republic using generational accounting
methodology.1 In what follows, Sections 2, 3 and 4 review the standard
methodological framework of generational accounting. Section 2 discusses
the theoretical framework of generational accounting. Section 3 specifies
the variables and the parameters necessary to calculate generational ac-
counts of the current generations. Section 4 presents two main methods of
assessing fiscal sustainability. In Sections 5, 6 and 7 applied data and em-
pirical results are presented.
2. Intertemporal Public Budget Constraint
The government intertemporal budget constraint says that the present
value of current and future government revenues has to be equal to the sum
of the present value of current and future government purchases and
the level of net debt. Put formally, the government intertemporal budget
constraint is stated as follows:
t                      
 Nt,k+  Nt,k =  Gt,y + Dt (1)
k=t–L k=t+1    y=t
where Gt,y stands for the present value of year y net public purchases in pe-
riod t (base year).2 Gt,y is calculated as the present value of the difference
between public expenditures and revenues not affected by size of the po-
pulation. Dt is defined as a public debt in year t less the present value of ex-
pected privatization revenues.3 Finally, Nt,k denotes the present value of net
taxes, which will be paid throughout the lifecycle by agents born in year k.4
It is obvious that the first item on the left-hand side corresponds to the sum
of the present values of all net taxes paid by currently living agents from
now to the end of their lives. The second item on the left-hand side tallies
with the cumulative present value of lifetime net taxes of agents not yet
born.
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1 An overview of the application of generational accounting in different countries is provided by
Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1998).
2 All fiscal data (Gt,y,D t and total Nt,k) come from GFS in 2004 (consolidated public budgets).
For details see Appendix 1.
3 Sometimes government net wealth Wt is used instead of net public debt with the opposite sign.
Because of the lack of data on government net wealth in the Czech Republic we prefer the vari-
able Dt. The arguments can be found in the Section 5.4.
4 The symbolism is similar to (Bonin, 1997). Another, probably widely used specification comes
from Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Liebfritz (1998).3. Specifications and the Projections of Variables and Parameters
3.1 Lifetime Net Taxes of Current Generations
In the great majority of applied studies, generational accounts are con-
structed as a forward-looking indicator. This means that we reflect only
the current and expected development of population size and its structure.
It follows that the total net taxes of currently living generations in present
terms do not take into account the development of taxes and transfers be-
fore the base year.5
The current generations are defined as all agents who live in the present.
Let t be the base year and L be the maximal lifespan, then current agents
were born between t – L and t. Thus, the present value of all net taxes paid
by currently living agents is quantified over the period from tto t+L, i.e. un-
til the youngest agent (born in the base year t) from the current genera-
tions die. The first term on the left-hand side in (1) can be expressed as:
tt k + L t–i  Nt,k =     ti,k + Pi,k (1 + r) (2)
k=t–L k=t–L i=t
where Pi,k is the number of people born in k and still living in i. Next, ti,k re-
presents the absolute level of the net taxes paid in period i by a representative
agent born in k. The discount rate r converts future net taxes to the base year.
The base-year age-specific per capita taxes and transfers t
l
i,k of type l are
projected by applying the time invariant growth rate g.6 It is usually as-
sumed, for projection purposes, that growth rate g should reflect labor pro-
ductivity growth, i.e. age- and gender-adjusted per capita taxes and trans-
fers grow at the rate of labor productivity. Thus, applying constant g does
not alter the shape of the particular average absolute tax and transfer age
profiles. It follows that the share of the corresponding items in the income
of a representative agent of the same age and gender is constant over time.7
The t
l
i,k can be calculated for different k in each year i using the formula (3).
tl





i,k expresses the average tax or transfer of type l of the representa-
tive agent born in k in year i.8 In the case that t
l
i,k is positive (negative) then
the item represents a tax (transfer) paid (obtained). Finally, aggregating all
the taxes and transfers of type l, we get the absolute net taxes of a repre-
sentative agent born in k in year i, i.e. ti,k.9
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5 Gokhale and Page (1997) calculated total net taxes of all current generations taking into ac-
count demography together with taxes and benefits also before the base year.
6 Identically to the case of r we presume g to be constant over the whole period, but alternative
scenarios are presented in Section 6.
7 Introducing this assumption seems to be the standard approach to generational accounts. Con-
versely, reflecting potential changes in age-specific profiles as a result of population’s ageing
could make projections more reliable.
8 Section 5 provides a detailed description of different types of taxes and transfers. Data used
for estimation purposes are described as well. In addition, Appendix 2 presents graphs of dif-
ferent tl.ti,k =  tl
i,k (4)
l
It is worth noting that neither in the residual approach nor in the sus-
tainability approach10 is the total present value of the net taxes of the cur-
rent generations restricted.
3.2 Generational Accounts of Current Generations
The length of the remaining lifespan (k+L– t) of currently living agents
varies in thebase year because of differentk. Thus, thepresent value of there-
maining lifetime net taxes of the currently living generation born in k, de-
fined as Nt,k, are not directly comparable among themselves. But it is possi-
ble to compare the net taxes in the present value terms of a representative
agent of age i – k in the base year t. Finally, we define a year t account of
the generation born in kas the present value of taxes paid reduced by the pre-
sent value of transfers obtained throughout the remaining lifespan divided
by the number of agents in the base year t. Generational accounts for diffe-
rent k are calculated according to the formula (5) and labeled as GACUR
t,k.
k+L t–i




CUR = ––––––––––––––– (5)
Pt,k
Using equation (2) we can present the generational account equivalently
as shown in formula (6). Put differently, the generational account stands
for the present value net taxes of a representative agent born in k and still
living in t.
Nt,k GAt,k
CUR = –––– (6)
Pt,k
3.3 Government Purchases
It has to be pointed out, that Gt,y has a different meaning than the go-
vernment consumption in national accounts. According to generational ac-
counts methodology Gt,y is composed of revenues and expenditures whose
size does not depend on the size of living population. The projection method
of government purchases is similar to the one discussed before in relation
to the projection of age-specific tax and transfer profiles.
4. Intergenerational Imbalance and Fiscal Sustainability
Appraisal
The theoretical concept of generational accounting is widely accepted. To
assess the intergenerational imbalance (sustainability of public finances),
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9 Taxes are treated in positive terms, whereas transfers are treated in negative terms.
10 Both the residual as well as the sustainability approach are discussed in detail in Section 4.different indicators based on the generational accounting methodology can
be constructed. In the following parts two major approaches will be dis-
cussed, theresidual and thesustainability approaches. But alternative ways
can be also applied.11
4.1 The Residual Approach and Generational Accounts of Future
Generations
In the residual approach we assume that the government is not willing to
change thecurrent setting of thesystem for thetime being. As aresult, all neces-
sary changes to attain fiscal sustainability will be faced by future generations.
The residual approach proceeds in the following steps: First, the total pre-
sent value of the net taxes of all currently living agents is calculated apply-
ing no constraint on its value, using formula (2). Second, the present value
of expected net public debt and net public purchases is calculated. Finally,
theintertemporal budget constraint is applied to calculate thesum of thepre-
sent value of the net taxes of future agents. Since the intertemporal budget
constraint must hold, the sum of the present value of the net taxes of all fu-
ture generations is calculated as a residual, as presented in equation (7).
                                                   t
 Nt,k =  Gt,y + Dt –  Nt,k (7)
k=t+1 y=t k=t–L
Usually generational accounts of future agents are assumed to be equal
except for a productivity growth adjustment.12 Taking into account these
assumptions, the generational account of the representative future agent
is calculated as follows:
                    (1+g)    k–t
 Nt,k =  Pk,k GA
k,k
FUT  ––––––  (8)
k=t+1          k=t+1  (1+r)
Because generational accounts of both generations (GAt,t
CUR,G A k,k
FUT) re-
flect expected lifetime growth-adjusted net tax payments of a representa-
tive agent discounted to the base year, they are directly comparable.
In the residual approach, the condition for examining the sustainability
of a particular fiscal policy is based on the comparison of growth-adjusted
net taxes of the current and future representative agents. It follows that
a different treatment of current and future generations from the point of
view of the net taxes of a representative agent is a criterion for deciding
about the size and direction of the intergenerational redistribution. In other
words, comparing the value of GAt,t
CUR and GAk,k
FUT reflects intergenerational
shifts necessary to sustain public budgets. This means that when applying
the residual approach a fiscal strategy which differently affects current and
future agents (GAt,t
CUR   GAk,k
FUT), is called intergenerationally imbalanced.
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11 For example Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff (1999) consider a necessary change in govern-
ment purchases or a change in the specific net tax rate to close the sustainability gap as an al-
ternative indicator of intergenerational imbalance/fiscal sustainability.
12 Unfortunately, introducing the above assumptions, the residual approach does not enable us
to express anything about the redistribution within the future generations.Because intergenerational shifts are necessary to assure validity of the in-
tertemporal budget constraint, such a fiscal policy is also deemed unsus-
tainable. Looking at the problem from the other perspective, we see that
a sustainable fiscal policy will not lead to any intergenerational redistri-
bution and GAt,t
CUR =G A k,k
FUT.
4.2 The Sustainability Approach
The sustainability approach looks at current and future generations in
the same manner. This means that the total lifetime net taxes of current
as well as future generations are constructed using the same procedure,
i.e. using formula (2) and its modification for future generations. Conse-
quently, the total lifetime net taxes of all generations are constructed with-
out applying the intertemporal budget constraint.
The items of the budget constraint in formula (10) are constructed in
the same way as in the residual approach except for the sum of the total
present value of net taxes of future generations. The criterion of the fiscal
sustainability is the “sustainability gap”.13 This is defined as the total
amount of the government liabilities resulting from the current fiscal po-
licy pursued indefinitely, i.e. the imbalance in the intertemporal budget con-
straint. Alternatively, the sustainability gap equals the total present value
of insufficient public revenues, which is required to fulfill the intertempo-
ral public budget constraint. On the one hand, if the sustainability gap is
positive, the present value of all potential public expenditures exceeds
the present value of all public revenues. On the other hand, a negative sus-
tainability gap indicates the government’s intertemporal surplus and
the option for reducing net taxes.
                  t                  
SGt =  Gt,y –  Nt,k –  N’t,k + Dt (10)
y=t k=t–L k=t+1
where N’t,k indicates the total present value of the net taxes of future agents
proceeding the actual fiscal policy indefinitely. Because the sustainability
approach does not distinguish between current and future generations, we
can simulate the impact of a tax or a transfer on both living as well as fu-
ture generations. But at the same time, compared to the residual approach,
we know nothing about intergenerational redistribution.
Since the absolute present value of the sustainability gap is hard to in-
terpret, it is recommended to relate the sustainability gap to GDP. Such
a ratio can be used for an international comparison. As well as in the pre-
vious approach the final result should not be used as the public indebted-
ness forecast.
5. General Data Description
Creating generational accounts for the Czech Republic, we follow
the standard procedure. The empirical evaluation of the intertemporal bud-
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13 It is possible to find other names for this indicator, for example Cardarelli, Sefton and Kot-
likoff (1999) call it “intertemporal budget gap”.get constraint requires projections of population, taxes, transfers, govern-
ment purchases and the initial value of net public debt. At the same time
the value of the parameters g and r has to be set. We start with 2004 da-
ta. The main sources of data used are the FoS UK (Faculty of Science of 
the Charles University, Prague) population projection, the CSO (Czech Sta-
tistical Office) household budget survey and MF (Ministry of Finance) go-
vernment financial statistics.
5.1 Demography
Generational accounting is based on a long-term population projection by
Burcin and Kuãera (2004). Because generational accounts (GAt,k
CUR as well
as GAk,k
FUT) are defined as per capita net taxes in present terms, the value
is influenced by the size of the generation. Since the size of future genera-
tions is expected to fall in the coming decades, the total amount of net
taxes Nt,k is divided by a smaller number Pk,k. In other words, this means
that the accumulated public debt will have to be financed by a smaller num-
ber of people. In addition, the structure of the population critically influ-
ences the absolute amount of net taxes.
5.2 Age Specific Revenues and Expenditures14
The main part of revenue and expenditure age profiles was taken from
the Household Budget Survey of 2002. In our particular case we constructed
age-specific profiles using only data from 2002. The raw data are rather er-
ratic though an apparent age-specific profile can be recognized. Following
generational accounting literature and trying to make our analysis and
graphs more tractable, we filtered all data using the HP filter. After that
the relative age profiles were calculated and recalculated to fit the actual
budget data.
There is uncertainty about future productivity growth and the discount
rate. Moreover it is hard to choose specific values for r and g. Therefore, we
introduced a set of both parameters into our empirical analysis. The value
of r is influenced by the government revenues and expenditure risk which
is hard to judge from the current perspective.15 In the case of labor-pro-
ductivity growth we took into account mainly long-term factors and the con-
vergence of the Czech economy with the EU average. We have calculated
generational accounts for current as well as future generations and the su-
stainability gap using variants g (0.01, 0.02, 0.03) and r (0.03, 0.05, 0.07).
5.2.1 Revenues
For the empirical evaluation of the generational accounts, gathering
the age-specific profiles of taxes and transfers of both genders is necessary.
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14 Bonin (1997) shows that using term “Age-specific” and “Non-age specific” could be mislead-
ing. We notify the argument, but continue using it, because of its broad utilization.
15 Lau (2000) applied varying discount rate according to age for different agents.Taxes and transfers are broken down into several categories. First, public
revenue and expenditure items, whose size depends on the number and age
of people, have to be identified. In the case of the Czech Republic the fol-
lowing revenue items have been chosen: Value Added Tax (VAT) (19.3 %)16,
Excises (E) (9 %), Personal Income Tax (PIT) (12.6 %), Social Security Con-
tributions (SSC) (36.6 %), Inheritance Tax (IT) (1.4 %), Corporate Income
Tax (CIT) (11.3 %) and Other Age-Specific Revenues (OR) (3.7 %). Second,
all public-budget revenue items are assigned to individual age groups on
the basis of the Household Budget Survey of 2002. The only exception is
the Corporate Income Tax, which is treated like a tax on labor income (Per-
sonal Income Tax), i.e. relative age profiles of both personal as well as cor-
porate income taxes are identical.17,18
5.2.2 Expenditures
We found the following expenditure items to be age specific: Old-Age Pen-
sions (P) (19.9 %), Disability Pensions (DP) (4.2 %)19, Unemployment Bene-
fits (UB) (3.4 %), Education Expenditures (EE) (10 %), Health Expendi-
tures (HE) (15.1 %), Sickness Benefits (SB) (2.1 %), Other Social Expen-
ditures (OSE) (5.8 %) and Other Age-Specific Expenditures (OE) (31.2 %).
Data concerning all forms of pension benefits come from the Czech Social
Security Administration database. The information concerning Education
Expenditures was provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports.
The General Health Insurance Company provided the health care data. As
in the case of revenue, the remaining age-specific expenditure profiles were
obtained from the Household Budget Survey of 2002.
Our study shows that the most important part of age-specific expendi-
tures is comprised of other age-specific expenditures, i.e. with flat age pro-
file. This could appear unsatisfactory at the first sight, but we have to bear
in mind that this item is a sum of expenditures on General Public Services,
Defense, Housing, Public Order and Safety. In our view it is impossible to
quantify which age group uses more/less of these public expenditures. So,
for example, we assume that the level of expenditures on defense depends
on the size of population, but not on its age structure.
5.3 Government Purchases
Government purchases were quantified as a balance of non-age-specific
expenditures and non-age-specific revenues. The ratio of non-age-specific
revenues (expenditures) to total revenues (expenditures) is about 6.0 %
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16 The number indicates the percentage of the total revenue.
17 See (Cardarelli – Sefton – Kotlikoff, 1999) for details.
18 The idea behind this argument states that the burden of corporate income tax is finally car-
ried mainly by employees, next by consumers or share-holders. Some working papers elaborate
on a Corporate Income Tax more sophisticatedly. See for example (Auerbach – Chang, 2003).
19 Other forms of pension benefits (survivor’s pensions) were assigned to old-age.(12.9 %).20 The absolute amount of Gt reaches CZK 86 billion in 2004,
i.e. the value of non-age-specific expenditures exceeds the value of non-age-
specific revenues by CZK 86 billion in 2004. We detected the following non-
-age-specific revenue items: Property Income (2.5 %), Capital Revenue
(1.1 %), Grants (2.4 %). The following expenditures were assessed so as not
to be dependent on the number of people and their age: Fuel and Energy
(0.2 %), Agriculture and Forestry (2.5 %), Mining and Mineral Resources
(0.2 %) and Transport and Communications (10.0 %).
5.4 Public Net Wealth and Net Debt
Net wealth is defined as a part of assets financed entirely by own re-
sources. In other words, it is a potential source of privatization revenues.
In fact, it is difficult to determine the actual market price of public assets.21
In the case of the Czech Republic the most important government assets
are non-financial assets. These comprise fixed assets such as roads, public
buildings, land and so forth. Unfortunately, the size and value of this pub-
lic property has not been precisely specified in the Czech Republic yet.22
The key issue is whether and to what extent these fixed assets could be sold
to obtain the lacking revenues. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the go-
vernment would sell all of its assets.23
In our view, government net wealth according to the national accounts
overestimates the value of property which can actually be privatized. As
a result, we define Dt as the gross public debt less the actual privatization
revenues and the expected present value of future privatization revenues
for the next few years.24
6. Results
The analysis covers the entire public sector during the period from 2004
to 2150. Because of the differences between the sexes we calculated the ge-
nerational accounts separately for males and females.
Following the structure of the theoretical part, the generational accounts
of the currently living agents were computed at the beginning. Conse-
quently, they were applied when the residual as well as the sustainability
approaches were followed. Tables 1 and 2 show the present value of the re-
maining lifetime taxes and transfers of a representative agent when labor
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20 For details see Appendix 2 – General Government Operations, 2004.
21 As an alternative, some authors try to estimate the market value of public net wealth as
the sum of the present value of the financial flows from public assets.
22 Public finances have been growing in deficit since 1995. Regardless of this unfavorable de-
velopment the net public wealth is rising continually according to the CSO. The govern-
ment’s wealth is not rising because of prudent government financial policy, but due to the evolv-
ing accounting procedures at the CSO with respect to the recording public assets.
23 To overcome this problem some authors estimate the value of the government’s wealth that
can be privatized. See for example (Gál – Simonovits – Szabó – Tarcali, 2000).
24 The estimates of current and future privatization revenues come from the government’s do-
cument Projection of Revenues and Expenditure in 2006. The document offers a rough estimate
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TABLE 1 Generational Accounts and Their Components for Females (2004) (CZK thousand)
Age VAT E PIT SSC IT CIT OR P DP SB UB OSE EE HE OE GA
2004
0 599 243 260 769 37 234 136 -368 -77 -62 -108 -260 -739 -483 -1298 -1117
5 660 281 301 891 42 271 135 -427 -89 -71 -125 -259 -760 -498 -1286 -933
10 690 304 326 963 46 293 127 -450 -95 -77 -136 -252 -591 -498 -1219 -571
15 720 333 356 1054 49 320 121 -478 -104 -85 -151 -242 -363 -506 -1155 -130
20 751 364 403 1196 54 362 118 -535 -117 -93 -159 -230 -134 -531 -1127 321
25 720 356 428 1275 54 384 111 -577 -125 -88 -140 -207 0 -530 -1059 602
30 673 339 438 1308 53 394 104 -640 -134 -75 -117 -182 0 -533 -997 631
35 640 329 440 1303 54 395 101 -751 -148 -66 -99 -156 0 -564 -970 508
40 583 308 403 1167 54 362 95 -846 -156 -58 -80 -118 0 -578 -912 224
45 529 282 337 940 53 303 89 -967 -157 -50 -60 -79 0 -591 -856 -227
50 459 240 245 656 49 220 81 -1085 -142 -36 -37 -51 0 -580 -779 -758
55 384 193 143 365 43 128 73 -1213 -115 -20 -13 -37 0 -559 -701 -1329
60 309 152 55 127 37 49 65 -1169 -92 -6 0 -29 0 -527 -620 -1649
65 244 120 12 19 29 10 56 -1005 -73 0 0 -25 0 -480 -531 -1624
70 192 93 0 0 22 0 46 -802 -54 0 0 -20 0 -410 -436 -1369
75 148 71 0 0 17 0 36 -598 -36 0 0 -13 0 -326 -342 -1043
80 112 53 0 0 13 0 27 -423 -21 0 0 -7 0 -248 -257 -752
85 80 38 0 0 10 0 19 -290 -12 0 0 -5 0 -183 -184 -527
90 55 26 0 0 7 0 13 -188 -8 0 0 -4 0 -131 -127 -355
95 39 18 0 0 5 0 9 -116 -6 0 0 -3 0 -92 -89 -233
100 16 7 0 0 2 0 4 -41 -3 0 0 -1 0 -37 -36 -90
TABLE 2 Generational Accounts and Their Components for Males (2004), (CZK thousand)
Age VAT E PIT SSC IT CIT OR P DP SB UB OSE EE HE OE GA
2004
0 572 231 361 1068 36 325 143 -358 -81 -68 -118 -262 -747 -526 -1363 -789
5 624 265 416 1230 41 374 140 -413 -93 -78 -134 -262 -760 -522 -1337 -509
10 642 283 444 1313 44 399 131 -426 -99 -84 -145 -248 -588 -501 -1248 -83
15 663 307 482 1425 47 433 122 -441 -106 -92 -159 -229 -359 -495 -1167 432
20 687 333 543 1611 51 488 117 -482 -118 -100 -167 -210 -132 -515 -1121 987
25 658 326 577 1716 51 518 109 -510 -124 -95 -147 -186 0 -521 -1043 1330
30 616 311 582 1729 50 523 102 -562 -134 -82 -124 -163 0 -541 -977 1331
35 592 307 567 1667 50 509 100 -670 -152 -71 -109 -143 0 -598 -953 1096
40 535 286 505 1449 49 453 92 -747 -162 -61 -89 -114 0 -621 -880 695
45 481 266 438 1210 48 393 85 -855 -170 -54 -70 -81 0 -648 -814 228
50 414 233 351 935 44 315 76 -956 -163 -44 -48 -52 0 -646 -725 -266
55 344 195 251 655 39 226 67 -1102 -141 -28 -23 -35 0 -634 -640 -826
60 273 155 140 362 33 126 58 -1186 -106 -11 0 -24 0 -599 -556 -1335
65 212 119 43 113 27 38 49 -1100 -77 0 0 -16 0 -545 -472 -1608
70 162 90 0 14 21 0 41 -899 -53 0 0 -9 0 -467 -387 -1488
75 122 68 0 0 14 0 32 -689 -33 0 0 -4 0 -376 -307 -1174
80 92 51 0 0 10 0 25 -515 -19 0 0 -3 0 -288 -238 -884
85 69 39 0 0 7 0 19 -377 -11 0 0 -2 0 -212 -179 -647
90 51 29 0 0 6 0 14 -255 -6 0 0 -2 0 -155 -132 -450
95 37 21 0 0 4 0 10 -156 -4 0 0 -1 0 -112 -96 -297
100 15 8 0 0 2 0 4 -51 -2 0 0 0 0 -44 -38 -107
Note: Value Added Tax (VAT), Excises (E), Personal Income Tax (PIT), Social Security Contributions (SSC), Inheri-
tance Tax (IT), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), Other Age-Specific Revenues (OR), Old-Age Pensions (P), Disa-
bility Pensions (DP), Sickness Benefits (SB), Unemployment Benefits (UB), Other Social Expenditures (OSE),
Education Expenditures (EE), Health Expenditures (HE), Other Age-Specific Expenditures (OE)productivity growth is set at 2 % and the discount rate is set at 5 %. Dif-
ferent columns represent particular tax and revenue items. Finally, the ge-
nerational accounts of current generations are defined as asum of all columns
in Tables 1 and 2.
The same, but aggregated, information is depicted in Graph 1. The hori-
zontal axis represents the age of the agent in year 2004. The vertical axis
depicts the cumulated present value of all taxes and transfers which is paid
by a representative agent of a different age between 2004 and the end of
his/her life, i.e. generational account.
It is possible to reach some important conclusions using the tables and
the graph. A significant part of Graph 1 lies below zero. This means that
a significant part of the current population gets more from the public bud-
get than it pays in taxes during the remaining lifetime. In other words, only
people aged approximately from 12 to 45 (in 2004) will produce positive
a difference between remaining lifetime taxes and transfers. Conversely,
the rest of the population will generate a deficit. If we take into account
the population’s ageing and worsening age structure, the current system of
taxes and transfers looks unsustainable even when checking the graph vi-
sually.
The generational account of a representative agent who was born in year
2004 (see figure for age 0 in Graph 1) is negative, i.e. the agent will obtain
more from the public budget than he/she will pay over his/her entire life-
span. In the case that the government cannot finance these deficits using
additional sources of revenue, intergenerational shifts of the fiscal burden
are expected. So, even without quantifying generational accounts of future
generations and the sustainability gap we can say that the current fiscal
policy leads to adverse intergenerational redistribution of the fiscal burden
and should be changed.
The difference between male and female generational accounts seems to
be important. We admit that addressing the differences between sexes is
not the main goal of our analysis. Nevertheless, it is interesting to realize
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GRAPH 1 Generational Accounts of Current Generations by Gender (2004) (CZK thousand)



























Khow differences concerning the position on the labor market, consumption
behavior,  etc. can influence the sustainability of public finances.
When building generational accounts, we explicitly assume that age- and
gender-adjusted absolute per capita taxes and transfers grow in relation to
labor-productivity growth. Moreover, to make different generational ac-
counts comparable we have to discount future values to the base year 2004.
Thus, the present value of future taxes and transfers heavily depends on
the size of the discount rate and labor-productivity growth rate.25 Intro-
ducing different values of the two key parameters affects the results as
shown in Table 3.
When testing thesensitivity of fiscal sustainability with respect togandr,
we reached the following conclusions. Increasing the productivity growth
leads to thegap widening between public expenditures and revenues.26Sim-
ply put, both taxes and transfers are indexed by the same measure. So
the gap, whether positive or negative, grows at the same rate if the struc-
ture and the size of the population do not change. Unfortunately, in the case
of the Czech Republic the gap is negative and demographic development
will even worsen the situation.
The higher the discount rate the lower the generational account of cur-
rent generations. The same conclusion refers to the size of the generational
account of future generations as well as to the sustainability gap.
In all cases of different g and r the present value of the net tax burden of
a representative agent is negative, i.e. this agent obtains more transfers
than he/she pays on taxes over his/her entire lifetime. On the contrary,
the generational accounts of future generations, calculated using the resi-
dual approach, are positive. This implies that future generations will face
the opposite situation compared with the currently living generations from
the tax and transfer point of view.
If the structure or public revenues and expenditures remain fixed and
the demography develops in accordance with our projection, we estimate
the sustainability gap to be positive regardless of the combination of g and r.
For example, if the discount rate equals 5 % and productivity grows at 2 %,
the government accumulates debt between 2004 and 2150 of 297 % of 2004
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25 The problems of choosing g and r are discussed in Section 5.2.
26 The sentence holds true if revenues and expenditures are strictly indexed on labor-produc-
tivity growth. Under this condition and applying our approach we could say that productivity
growth does not help. But we have to be cautious. It is tempting to say that the paper finds
the current setting of fiscal policy to be unsustainable when indexed to productivity growth.
Again we have to stress that our approach does not include the reaction of the rest of the eco-
nomy to fiscal policy and vice versa.
TABLE 3 Generational Accounts of Current and Future Generations under Different Scenarios
(CZK thousand)
g (%) 1 2 3
r (%) 3 5 7 3 5 7 3 5 7
GA current –1081 –902 –862 –1497 –948 –883 –2629 –1090 –904
GA future 2761 2021 1682 4655 2910 2122 8534 4512 2849
Sustainability gap (% GDP) 454 211 131 797 297 131 1608 460 214GDP, as presented in Table 3. In the case that g increases by only one per-
centage point to 3 %, the ratio of the sustainability gap to GDP rises to
460 % ceteris paribus. It seems indexation of taxes and benefits is an im-
portant factor in the potential development of public finances.
Since the beginning of the 1990s generational accounts have been con-
structed for many countries all over the world. To give a reader some idea
about the situation in the rest of the world, we present the results con-
cerning some other countries.27 All the results are calculated setting g to
1.5 % and r to 5 %.
Comparing the results on the sustainability gap to GDP in Table 4 for dif-
ferent countries, we can draw the following conclusions.28 First, the No De-
mographic Change scenario indicates how large the sustainability gap
would be if thesize and thestructure of thepopulation remain stable. Table4
demonstrates that changing demography seems to be a significant factor
which negatively affects the intergenerational imbalance in all the coun-
tries. Second, leaving aside the impact of the public debt alleviates the in-
tergenerational imbalance. But its extent, except in the case of Belgium,
appears to be substantially smaller than that of changing demography.
The equivalent outcome holds in the case of the Czech Republic, i.e. the im-
pact of changing population size and structure overvalues the impact of
the zero initial debt. Third, in the case of the Czech Republic the difference
between theBaseline scenario and theNoDemographic Change value seems
to be smaller. It appears that there are also other important factors apart
from worsening demographic conditions. As previously mentioned, the in-
tergenerational imbalance would not disappear with higher labor-produc-
tivity growth. This indicates that the system of taxes and transfers in
the Czech Republic faces structural problems, i.e. under the current set-up
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27 See (Auerbach – Kotlikoff – Leibfritz, 1998) for results concerning the United States, Japan,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Belgium, and (Gál – Simonovits – Szabó – Tarcali, 2000) for re-
sults on Hungary.
28 We are conscious of the fact that the methodology of generational accounts is not unified. In
addition, the results concerning countries other than the Czech Republic are almost ten years
old. This means that important changes relating to demography and fiscal policy could have oc-
curred since that time.
TABLE 4 Sustainability Gaps in Different Countries (% GDP)
Baseline  No Demographic Zero Initial
scenario Change Debt
United States 159 22 97
Japan 337 77 309
Germany 156 –8 81
Italy 223 18 98
Sweden –31 –67 –45
Belgium 107 63 –218
Hungary 424 119 384
Czech Republic 248 152 226
Note: In the case of the Czech Republic the base year is set to 2004. The rest of the data relate to 1995.of public revenues and expenditures the system of public finances is pre-
disposed to deficit financing.29,30 In addition, the impact of demographic
factors aggravates the fiscal/intergenerational imbalance.
To sketch the potential impact of intentional adjustments in taxes and
transfers, we present mechanistic simulations of the impact of a variation
in selected age-specific profiles on intergenerational redistribution and fis-
cal sustainability. On the revenue side the 10% increase in the age-specific
profile of value added tax(VAT) and personal income tax(PIT) is introduced.
On the expenditure side the 10% decrease in the age-specific profile of old-
-age pensions (P) and health expenditures (HE) is introduced. In other
words, a representative agent will pay/obtain 10 % more/less in absolute
terms compared with the Baseline scenario.31 The results are presented in
Table5. Indeed, all of thepresented scenarios improve theintergenerational
imbalance and fiscal sustainability indicators. The improvement appears
to be significant but not sufficient. The combination of all refinements re-
duces the ratio of the sustainability gap to GDP by almost 100 percentage
points. Still, this is not enough to solve the problems of intergenerational
redistribution and fiscal sustainability. We should stress again the pure
mechanistic nature of these results.
Finally, Table 6 presents information about the impact of altering demo-
graphic factors on generational accounts of future agents. The results in-
dicate the present value of growth-adjusted net taxes of a representative
future agent which guarantees fiscal sustainability.32 According to our cal-
culations, it is evident that the generational account of the future agent in-
creases over time in the case of the Czech Republic. Moreover, if no changes
in taxes and transfers are undertaken, the per capita burden of future
agents, necessary to restore fiscal sustainability, will almost double over
the next 15 years.
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29 Even if no negative demographic factors come into effect.
30 See for example (Bezdûk – Dybczak – Krejdl, 2003).
31 As well as in most of the presented results g =2   % and r =5  % .
32 The results are calculated applying the residual approach. For details see Section 4.
TABLE 5 The Impact of 10% Adjustment in Taxes and Transfers (CZK thousand)
Baseline ↑ VAT ↑ PIT ↓ P ↓ HE TOTAL
GA current –948 –889 –917 –912 –897 –771
GA future 2910 1613 1673 1535 1604 1079
Sustainability gap (% GDP) 297 275 284 269 274 204
TABLE 6 Growth Adjusted Generational Accounts of Future Generations in Different Years 
(CZK thousand)
2004 2009 2014 2019
GA future 1782 2 265 2845 3531
base year = 100 100 127 160 198The timing of fiscal reform is therefore avery important factor from thein-
tergenerational point of view, since the population is getting smaller and
older. In other words, the number of people really facing the burden accu-
mulated by previous generations is decreasing. This implies that the go-
vernment should not hesitate too long to revise the current system if it
wishes to sustain fiscal policy without dramatic changes in taxes and trans-
fers of future generations. The costs of delayed action seem to be important.
7. Conclusions
We have presented the first set of generational accounts for the Czech Re-
public. Compared to traditional indicators such as the budget deficit and
public debt, generational accounts are forward looking and provide us with
information about potential intergenerational redistribution and sustain-
ability of public finances. The generational accounting approach captures
sustainability from both the aggregated macroeconomic as well as the re-
presentative agent’s point of view.
We show that the current fiscal policy is not sustainable due to the un-
equal treatment of current and future representative agents. According to
our analysis, a representative living agent born in 2004 obtains more bene-
fits than he/she pays in taxes over the rest of his/her life. On the contrary,
a representative agent not yet born will face the opposite situation. More-
over, the total amount of government liabilities, resulting from the current
fiscal policy pursued to 2150, reaches about 300 % of GDP in 2004. Thus,
when taking into account future demographic development and the strict
indexation rule, the fiscal policy appears to be unsustainable. Finally, ac-
cording to our results, the costs of delayed modification of taxes and bene-
fits seem to be important because of the worsening demographic factors.
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General Government Operations, 2004 (GFS 1986 methodology) (CZK billion)
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TAX REVENUE 963 General Public Services 78
Income Profits & Capital Gains Tax 253 Defense 51
Individual 133 Public Order & Safety 39
Corporate 120 Education 116
Social Security Contributions 388 Health 175
Taxes on Property 15 Social Security & Welfare 356
Domestic Taxes on Goods & Services 302 Old age pension 231
General Sales, Turnover & Value-Added Taxes 182 Sick benefits  25
Excises 96 Social security benefits 33
Taxes on Special Services 1 Other benefits 43
Taxes on Use of Goods & Services 16 Passive employment policy 7
Other Taxes on Goods & Services 7 Welfare 15
Taxes on International Trade & Transactions 4 Other  10
Import Duties 4 Housing & Community Amenities 84
Other Taxes 0 Recreation, Cultural & Religious Affairs  30
& Services
NONTAX REVENUE 62 Fuel and Energy 3
Entrepreneurial & Property Income 27 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 29
Administrative Fees & Charges, Nonind. Mining & Mineral Resources, Manufacturing
and Incidental Sales 24 &  Construction 3
Fines & Forfeits 4 Transportation & Communication 116
Other Nontax Revenue 7 Other Economic Affairs & Services 36
CAPITAL REVENUE 12 Other Expenditures 45
GRANTS 25
TOTAL REVENUE 1 062 TOTAL EXPENDITURE  1 160
DEFICIT –98
DEBT 659
NET WEALTH 4 710
Age Specific Revenue 998 Age Specific Expenditure 1 010
Income Profits & Capital Gains Tax 253 General Public Services 78
Social Security Contributions 388 Defense 51
Taxes on Property 15 Public Order & Safety 39
Domestic Taxes on Goods & Services 302 Education 116
Taxes on International Trade & Transactions 4 Health 175
Other Taxes 0 Social Security & Welfare 356
Administrative Fees & Charges 24 Housing & Community Amenities 84
Fines & Forfeits 4 Recreation, Cultural & Religious Affairs  30
& Services
Other Nontax Revenue 7 Other Economic Affairs & Services 36
Other Expenditures 45
Non-age Specific Revenue 64 Non-age Specific Expenditure 150
Entrepreneurial & Property Income 27 Fuel and Energy 3
Capital Revenue 12 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 29
Grants 25 Mining & Mineral Resources, Manufacturing  3
&  Construction
00 Transportation & Communication 116
TOTAL REVENUE 1 062 TOTAL EXPENDITURE  1 160APPENDIX 2
Age-Specific Taxes and Transfers (CZK thousand)
The major part of the age-specific profiles of a representative male and female were
calculated using the Household Budget Survey of 2002 provided by the Czech Sta-
tistical Office. Data concerning all forms of pension benefits come from the Czech So-
cial Security Administration database. Data reflecting Education Expenditures were
provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Finally, the General Health
Insurance Company provided the healthcare data.
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–100The presented age-specific taxes and transfers (graphsof different t l) give us anidea
of people’s behavior during their lifecycle. Moreover, we can infer from its level and
shape how people contribute to the public budget or benefit from public transfers de-
pending on their age.
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Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic
Kamil DYBCZAK – Czech National Bank, Prague (kamil.dybczak@cnb.cz)
The generational accounting approach used in this paper incorporates projected
demographic development and the parameters of current Czech fiscal policy into
an intertemporal government budget constraint. Compared with public-debt and
deficit data, the economic indicators based on generational accounting are forward
looking and yield additional information about fiscal policy.
To  assess the sustainability of Czech public budgets, the authors constructed
the first set of generational accounts for the Czech Republic. They found that, for
2004, a representative agent obtained more benefits than paid taxes; that is, the ge-
nerational account of the representative agent was negative. In addition, the total
amount of government liabilities resulting from the current fiscal policy, projected
to 2150, was estimated at about 300 percent of the national GDP in 2004. The au-
thors conclude that Czech fiscal policy is not sustainable; current taxes and bene-
fits should be modified in line with demographic projections in an effort to stabilize
public budgets.
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